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a b s t r a c t 
Machine learning based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) allow flexible and efficient au- 
tomated detection of cyberattacks in Internet of Things (IoT) networks. However, this has 
also created an additional attack vector; the machine learning models which support the 
IDS’s decisions may also be subject to cyberattacks known as Adversarial Machine Learning 
(AML). In the context of IoT, AML can be used to manipulate data and network traffic that 
traverse through such devices. These perturbations increase the confusion in the decision 
boundaries of the machine learning classifier, where malicious network packets are often 
miss-classified as being benign. Consequently, such errors are bypassed by machine learn- 
ing based detectors, which increases the potential of significantly delaying attack detection 
and further consequences such as personal information leakage, damaged hardware, and fi- 
nancial loss. Given the impact that these attacks may have, this paper proposes a rule-based 
approach towards generating AML attack samples and explores how they can be used to tar- 
get a range of supervised machine learning classifiers used for detecting Denial of Service 
attacks in an IoT smart home network. The analysis explores which DoS packet features 
to perturb and how such adversarial samples can support increasing the robustness of su- 
pervised models using adversarial training. The results demonstrated that the performance 
of all the top performing classifiers were affected, decreasing a maximum of 47.2 percent- 
age points when adversarial samples were present. Their performances improved following 
adversarial training, demonstrating their robustness towards such attacks. 
Crown Copyright © 2021 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license 













The proliferation in Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which
routinely collect sensitive information, is demonstrated by
their prominence in our daily lives. Although such devices
simplify and automate everyday tasks, they also introduce
tremendous security flaws. Current insufficient security mea-∗ Corresponding author. 






0167-4048/Crown Copyright © 2021 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) sures employed to defend smart devices make IoT the ‘weak-
est’ link to breaking into a secure infrastructure, and therefore
an attractive target to attackers. 
As the number of IoT devices increases exponentially
( Gubbi et al., 2013 ), the number of unknown vulnerabilities
and threats also increases, resulting in perimeter defences
becoming weaker. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have
emerged as successful attack detection and identification
methods in IoT networks. In particular, due to the rapid in-
crease in the development of IoT devices, their heterogene-
ity, and the amount of data that is produced from such tech- open access article under the CC BY license 












































































l  ologies, machine learning techniques have been integrated 
o support IDSs in IoT networks to defend against a greater ar- 
ay of attacks (e.g. Amouri et al., 2018; Anthi et al., 2018; Doshi 
t al., 2018; McDermott et al., 2018; Meidan et al., 2018; Shukla,
017 ). Many of these approaches employ supervised machine 
earning to support the detection of malicious behaviour in 
oT. In particular, a recent study by da Costa et al. (2019) re- 
iewing state-of-the-art IDSs for IoT reported that the ma- 
ority of these systems utilise supervised approaches, such 
s Support Vector Machines (SVM), Random Forest, and Deci- 
ion Trees. A recent supervised IDS evaluated using real net- 
ork data derived from a typical IoT testbed presented by 
nthi et al. (2018) also demonstrated that a Decision Tree was 
he best performing classifier for detecting cyber attacks in 
oT. 
However, the trained models which support such systems 
ay also be subject to attacks and thus introduce a new at- 
ack vector. Attacks that target the machine learning mod- 
ls within these systems are known as Adversarial Machine 
earning (AML). The aim is to exploit the weaknesses of the 
re-trained model by manipulating data and network traf- 
c that traverse through IoT devices. These perturbations in- 
rease the confusion in the decision boundaries of the ma- 
hine learning classifier, where malicious network packets 
re often miss-classified as being benign. Consequently, the 
odel’s effectiveness can be reduced and such errors are by- 
assed by the machine learning based detectors, which in- 
reases the potential of significantly delaying attack detection 
nd further consequences. 
Subsequently, the existence of such techniques suggests 
hat machine learning based detectors may be at risk. More 
pecifically, in the context of IoT, AML can be used to manip- 
late data from network traffic or data collected from the de- 
ices/sensors. From an adversary’s perspective, AML can also 
nclude perturbations to malicious data to cause an increase 
n misclassification, consequently bypassing the IDS. As ma- 
hine learning based detection mechanisms become increas- 
ngly common, it is understandable that the adversary’s moti- 
ation to bypass them also increases. Consequently, machine 
earning based detectors must be further evaluated against 
ML attacks. 
The experiments presented in this paper focus on hard- 
ning Denial of Service (DoS) defences against AML. DoS at- 
acks are considered as being one of the most severe attacks 
gainst IoT ( Chen et al., 2018; Doshi et al., 2018; Verma and 
anga, 2019 ). Such attacks affect the services of small net- 
orks, such as smart homes ( Verma and Ranga, 2019 ), by tar- 
eting the smart devices within such environments (e.g. smart 
ight bulbs, smart door locks, smart televisions) and making 
hem unavailable to the intended users ( Dhanjani, 2013; No- 
ra et al., 2014; Ronen and Shamir, 2016; Sivaraman et al., 2015 ).
n this case, securing such devices from DoS attacks has been 
he main focus in several recent studies (e.g. Anthi et al., 2018; 
yed et al., 2020; Vaccari, Aiello, Cambiaso, 2020 ). An important 
eature of DoS attacks is that it is feasible to deploy by craft- 
ng custom packets. In the context of AML, and as DoS attacks 
re self-contained, an adversary can manipulate various DoS 
acket features without voiding the attack. Network packets 
rom other attack types may also be manipulated; however,
uch packet behaviours are more sensitive to perturbation as hey affect the validity of the packet and, subsequently, the 
ttack itself. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation 
nto the behaviour of a supervised IDS against an AML attack 
n the context of IoT using network packet data. The work 
resented herein considers a realistic attacker model, as well 
s a dataset collected from a representative smart home IoT 
estbed. The main contributions of the work presented in this 
aper are the empirical investigations into: 
• Generating adversarial samples from a smart home IoT 
network dataset 
• Investigate the behaviour of a range of supervised classi- 
fication algorithms used for IDSs in IoT networks against 
these adversarial samples 
• Explore how adversarial training can be used to increase 
the robustness of such models 
The study was designed as follows (see Fig. 1 ): 1) randomly 
plit the smart home IoT network dataset into training and 
esting set, each containing 60% and 40% data points respec- 
ively, 2) evaluate a range of supervised classification algo- 
ithms and identify which are the best performing, 3) gener- 
te malicious adversarial DoS packets using a rule-based ap- 
roach, 4) evaluate the performance of the trained model in 
 on the generated adversarial samples in 3, 5) re-train and 
valuate the most affected model using a new training dataset 
hich includes a percentage of adversarial samples from 3. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into the fol- 
owing main sections: Section 2 presents the related work,





































































































Section 3 discusses the data collected as part of the evaluation
of a state-of-the-art IDS presented by Anthi et al. (2018) which
is used to support the AML experiments herein, Section 4 dis-
cusses AML attack types and approaches, Section 5 presents
an approach to generate malicious adversarial DoS packets,
Section 6 evaluates the performance of the model against AML
samples, Section 7 evaluates the performance of the model
following adversarial training, and finally Section 8 concludes
the paper. 
2. Related work 
Due to the advancement in machine learning, there has been a
substantial increase in IDSs which use such techniques for IoT
networks. Nevertheless, there has been significantly less focus
on AML in this context. In the field of cybersecurity, the current
research surrounding AML focuses on email spam classifiers,
malware detection, and very recently, there has been interest
in AML against network IDSs for traditional networks and ICS
( Anthi, Williams, Rhode, Burnap, Wedgbury, 2021 ) . 
In more detail, in the context of spam classifiers, both
Nelson et al. (2008) and Zhou et al. (2012) demonstrated
that an adversary can successfully exploit and bypass ma-
chine learning methods by including perturbations to a
small percentage of the original training data. In addition,
Grosse et al. (2017) evaluated the robustness of a neural net-
work trained on the DREBIN Android malware dataset. They
reported that the model misclassified the perturbed inputs in
the training set. This attack requires the adversary to have
some degree of knowledge of both the dataset and its features.
Furthermore, Hu and Tan (2017) presented a more sophisti-
cated adversarial technique that uses the concept of GAN to
successfully attack malware classifiers without requiring any
knowledge of the targeted system or dataset. 
In the context of IoT, there exist only a handful of investi-
gations into AML attacks; the majority of which focus on ma-
chine learning detection methods for malware. Particularly,
Abusnaina et al. (2019) investigated a range of off-the-shelf
methods to craft adversarial IoT software and a GEA method.
The results show that all adversarial samples were success-
ful in bypassing the detector. Moreover, Han et al. (2019) de-
veloped a framework that employs genetic algorithms to gen-
erate adversarial samples for IoT Android applications. The
framework demonstrated to have a success rate of nearly
100%. Furthermore, there exist a few studies that focus on de-
tecting and defending against adversarial samples in IoT. For
instance, Baracaldo et al. (2018) use contextual information
about the origin and the transformation of data points in the
training set to identify perturbed data in a sensors’ measure-
ment dataset. 
Furthermore, recent work has focused on AML against
traditional network IDSs and ICS. More specifically,
Rigaki (2017) use the KDD’99 dataset to generate adversarial
samples and demonstrate the effectiveness of AML against
supervised algorithms. Moreover, Zizzo et al. (2019) showcase
a simple AML attack against an LSTM classifier which was
applied on an ICS dataset. This attack required the man-
ual identification of features that needed to be perturbed
in order to generate adversarial samples. Yaghoubi andFainekos (2019) evaluate a gradient-based search approach
on a Simulink model from a steam condenser. This approach
demonstrated only to be efficient against a handful of sys-
tems that employ RNN with smooth activation functions.
Erba et al. (2019) present two types of real-time evasion
attacks, using RNN models and an autoencoder to generate
adversarial samples. 
As a result, the work cited above focuses on other areas of
cybersecurity, including email spam classifiers and traditional
malware detection. In the context of IoT, AML has been used
to target IoT software, Android applications, and sensor met-
ric data, and has yet to address the subject of how AML may
affect supervised machine learning-based IDSs trained on IoT
network traffic data. In the same context, there has yet to be
an investigation into how to defend such IDS systems against
AML attacks. 
3. Attacking a supervised machine learning 
detector 
To support the experiments presented in this paper, as well
as to demonstrate how AML can affect relevant supervised
machine learning-based detectors, the data collected as part
of the evaluation of a state-of-the-art IDS presented by
Anthi et al. (2018) was used. In particular, the IDS utilises a De-
cision Tree classifier to determine whether network packets
are malicious, the type of the attack which has occurred, and
which device is affected. The focus of this paper is on how AML
can be used to generate adversarial DoS packets to bypass su-
pervised models. The following Sections discuss the features
present in the smart home IoT network dataset and presents
the methodology behind generating adversarial samples and
evaluating the best performing supervised classifiers. 
3.1. Dataset 
To support the AML experiments presented in this paper,
an authentic and suitable-sized IoT smart home dataset was
used. More specifically, Anthi et al. (2018) assembled an IoT
testbed consisting of a range of commercially relevant and
representative IoT hardware, including the Belkin NetCam
camera, TP-Link NC200 Camera, TP-Link Smart Plug, Samsung
Smart Things hub, Amazon Echo Dot, British Gas Hive con-
nected to two sensors: a motion sensor and a window/door
sensor, and Lifx Lamp. In addition, a laptop was connected to
the network to continually record the network traffic and au-
tomatically generate and save the log files, and deploy various
attacks. For an illustration of the architecture of the testbed
and the components used for generating the datasets, see
Anthi et al. (2018) . 
A dataset containing both benign and malicious data
points was generated from the smart home IoT testbed in
which 3 weeks worth of benign data and 3 weeks of malicious
data was collected using the tcpdump ( Wir, 2018 ) tool. To gener-
ate the malicious data, Anthi et al. (2018) describes the 5 attack
types deployed on the testbed: Denial of Service (DoS), Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM)/Spoofing, Reconnaissance, and Replay. To
support the AML experiments herein, benign packets, as well
as packets that were identified as DoS, were selected. The fi-











































































al dataset consisted of 41,236 DoS and 110,390 benign data 
oints. 
. Adversarial machine learning 
s aforementioned, AML aims to automatically add perturba- 
ions to data points in order to increase the confusion in the 
ecision boundaries of the machine learning classifier. As a 
esult, malicious network packets can then miss-classified as 
eing benign. The following sections introduce the types of 
ML attacks, as well as the methods used to automatically 
enerate adversarial samples. 
.1. Adversarial attack types 
apernot et al. (2016) categorises adversarial attacks based on: 
• Their complexity . The consequences of such attacks can 
vary. Slightly reducing the confidence of a model may be 
considered as having fewer consequences in comparison 
to significantly reducing its overall precision. 
• The knowledge an adversary may have may be categorised 
into three main types of attacks: 
• White box attack: when an adversary has knowledge re- 
lated to the learning model, such as its architecture, the 
data it reads, and the features used to support its train- 
ing. 
• Black box attack: when an adversary does not know the 
internal workings of the target model. 
• Gray box attack: when an adversary has some knowl- 
edge surrounding the model’s architecture or the data 
it reads. 
.2. An attacker’s motive 
here are many reasons why an adversary may wish to deploy 
 DoS attack against IoT devices within a smart home. The 
urpose of a DoS attack is not to get unauthorized access or to 
btain sensitive data, but to flood the victim’s device in order 
o make these devices and their services unavailable to the 
ser. 
For example, in the context of an IoT smart home, devices 
uch as smart cameras may be used for physical security pur- 
oses. Attackers may use DoS to cause a camera to blackout,
llowing the coast to be clear to physically access a home 
ithout creating digital forensic evidence ( OConnor et al.,
019 ). 
.3. Attacker model 
he work presented herein considers the following attacker 
odel. It is assumed that the attacker does not have phys- 
cal access to the IoT devices, but has successfully retrieved 
he password for the central access point within the smart 
ome network. This type of attacker may be physically located 
ithin the wireless range of the targeted user’s smart home 
etwork. An attacker with control over the wireless router 
an access devices over the local network and can deploy 
everal different attacks ( Vanhoef and Piessens, 2014; 2015; 016 ). Such an attacker may have a pre-existing relationship 
ith the victim and was given administrative access to the 
outer/network ( OConnor et al., 2019 ) when they were present 
n the home. 
Subsequently, the attacker has the following capabilities: 
• Scan the network. 
• Passively eavesdrop on the wireless communications. 
• Deploy active attacks such as DoS, MAC/ARP Spoofing, and 
MITM. 
The attacker has the following objectives: 
• To collect information about the connected devices (i.e.
what devices are connected, what ports are open). 
• To make the devices unavailable to the intended user by 
deploying a DoS attack. 
Additionally, it is assumed that the smart home’s network 
s protected by utilising a supervised machine learning IDS. 
.4. Adversarial sample generation methods 
arious methods exist through which adversarial samples can 
e generated. Such approaches differ in complexity, speed,
nd efficiency. The aforementioned methods discussed in 
ection 2 provide sophisticated approaches for generating ad- 
ersarial samples. 
Two relevant techniques towards automatically gener- 
ting perturbed samples include the Fast Gradient Sign 
ethod (FGSM) and the Jacobian based Saliency Map At- 
ack (JSMA), presented by Goodfellow et al. (2014a) and 
apernot et al. (2016) respectively. Both FGSM and JSMA fol- 
ow similar methodologies, in that adding small perturbations 
o the original data can result in such samples exhibiting ad- 
ersarial characteristics and may be classified differently by 
he targeted model. Both methods are applied by using a pre- 
rained Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) network as the underlying 
odel for the adversarial sample generation. 
Rigaki (2017) evaluated the aforementioned methods on 
he NSL-KDD dataset for traditional IT systems and demon- 
trated that such approaches can successfully generate ad- 
ersarial samples that reduce the performance of the super- 
ised classifier. In addition, presenting a pre-trained model 
ith AML samples generated from a dataset of industrial IoT 
evice measurements demonstrated to significantly reduce its 
erformance by 20 percentage points ( Anthi et al., 2021 ). 
Given measurement data from IoT devices, such as 
ecorded temperatures from a sensor, the aforementioned ap- 
roaches may be applicable. However, such approaches as- 
ume that all features can be equally perturbed by the same 
redefined constant. Thus, when considering network packet 
eatures, this may mean that perturbing these values outside 
f their valid ranges may jeopardise the validity of the packet,
nd subsequently the attack. For instance, a flag can only be 
 or 1 and the packet length must have a maximum integer 
alue of 64 Kilobytes. Therefore, the aforementioned methods 
or generating adversarial samples may be ineffective when 
pplied to network packets. 

































































































5. Generating adversarial samples 
With the limitations of the approaches discussed in
Section 4.4 in mind, this paper proposes a rule-based ap-
proach towards generating AML DoS attack samples that aim
to target the supervised models which may support IDSs in
smart home IoT environments. 
The proposed approach is evaluated using malicious DoS
packets against IoT devices. The rationale for choosing this
type of attack is twofold; 1) DoS is one of the most catas-
trophic attacks against IoT devices ( Chen et al., 2018; Doshi
et al., 2018; Verma and Ranga, 2019 ), and 2) DoS attacks are not
connection-based; therefore, the packets are self-contained
and their features can be manipulated without voiding the at-
tack. 
Inspired by the JSMA and FGSM methods, the proposed ap-
proach aims to manipulate DoS attack packet features by con-
sidering: 
1. Feature Importance - identifying the most important fea-
tures that aid in attack detection. 
2. Practicality - perturbing packet features that an adversary
can modify by changing the attack configurations or by us-
ing packet crafting tools such as Scapy. Scapy (2020) . 
3. Validity - given their practicalities, perturbing packet fea-
ture values between their valid ranges. 
5.1. Feature selection 
Given the dataset discussed in Section 3.1 all benign and
DoS packets were extracted. For this analysis, it is essen-
tial to highlight that capture related features (e.g. caplen,
frame.enacp_type, frame.offset_shift, frame.len, frame.cap_len,
frame.marked, frame.ignored ) provided by the network sniffer
(i.e. tcpdump ) were omitted from the feature space. The ratio-
nale behind this is that such features are not included in the
original packet feature space and are generated by the net-
work traffic tool. Therefore, these features cannot be directly
manipulated by an adversary. However, the tcp.delta_time
feature was not omitted as it can be indirectly manipulated
by an adversary who may want to increase or delay the time
between the sending of DoS packets. 
Having removed the aforementioned attributes from the
dataset, the Information Gain filter, InfoGain Ratio Attribute
Evaluation , provided as part of Weka (2020) was used to identify
which features best discriminate between the malicious and
benign packets. Due to its computational efficiency and sim-
ple interpretation, Information Gain is one of the most popu-
lar feature selection methods ( Tang et al., 2014 ) and has been
used for feature selection in other relevant work (e.g. Alazab
et al., 2012; Anthi et al., 2018; Effendy et al., 2017 ). 
This filter evaluates the importance of the features in the
training dataset by measuring their information gain with re-
spect to the classes. In more detail, this filter measures how
each feature contributes to decreasing the overall entropy -
a measure to calculate the degree of disorder or uncertainty.
Subsequently, an important feature holds the most informa-
tion and reduces the entropy the most ( Sharma and Dey, 2012 ).
The entropy H (Cl ass ) for each class is defined in Eq. (1) , wherep i is the probability of randomly selecting an instance of class i
from the dataset and log 2 is the base 2 logarithm. The Informa-
tion Gain is defined in Eq. (2) , where H (Cl ass ) is the previously
defined entropy for each class and H (Cl ass | At t ribut e ) is the sum
of the entropies of a specific attribute A for each class. For a
working example of how the entropy and Information Gain
are calculated, see Omuya et al. (2021) . 
H (Cl ass ) = −
∑ 
p i log 2 p i (1)
I (C l ass, At t ribut e ) = H (Cl ass ) − H (Cl ass | At t ribut e ) (2)
Table 1 illustrates the top 15 features which best discrimi-
nate between benign and DoS packets with their respective in-
formation weight ranking. The remaining features resulted in
a much lower importance score. Based on these results, as well
as domain knowledge and practicality, the following features
were chosen to be manipulated to generate adversarial pack-
ets: len, tcp.time_delta, ip.flags.df, ip.flags.mf, ip.ttl, tcp.flags.urg,
tcp.flags.cwr , and tcp.flags.ecn . 
More specifically, adversaries may increase the network
packet size by introducing padding to the packet header
or they may reduce its size by fragmenting a single packet
into more packets ( Kirda and Trachtenberg, 2009 ). The
tcp.time_delta measures how much time has elapsed between
the arrival of the prior packet and the current packet. Lower
values of delta times correspond to higher rates of transmitted
packets which may indicate that a DoS attack has occurred.
Although this is a feature calculated by the network sniffer
tool, it will be used in this work to explore how a lower rate
flow of packets can affect the supervised classifier. 
The ip.flags.df can be set to indicate that a packet cannot
be fragmented for transmission. The ip.flags.mf can be set to
indicate that the packet contains more fragments. Time To
Live (TTL) refers to the amount of time or number of hops
a packet is set to exist inside a network before being dis-
carded by a router. When crafting or manipulating packet fea-
tures, the TTL value can be specified and set between 0 and
255. The TCP flags can also be set or unset, the tcp.flags.urg
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Fig. 2 – Distribution of len values for both benign and malicious packets. 































s used to indicate whether to abort other segments so that 
he given segment is given priority, the tcp.flags.cwr indicates 
hat the host received a TCP segment with the ECE flag set 
nd had responded in congestion control mechanism and the 
cp.flags.ecn flag is used to echo back the congestion indication.
n adversary can craft packets where an invalid or unusual 
ombination of flags can be set. 
To better understand the structure of benign IoT network 
ackets, and subsequently, define the ranges in which these 
eatures can be perturbed, the distribution of the values of 
he len and ip.ttl features in the benign packets were analysed.
igure 2 reports the distributions of the values for the len fea- 
ure for both packet types. The minimum len value for benign 
ackets was reported as 52, with the maximum value being 
,514. A significantly large number of len values for the benign 
ackets (22,921) fall between the ranges of 54 and 194. 
Figure 3 reports the distributions of the values for the ip.ttl 
eature for both packet types. The minimum ip.ttl value for penign packets was reported as 1, with the maximum value 
eing 255. A significantly large number of ip.ttl values for the 
enign packets (20,633) fall between the ranges of 30 and 70. 
.2. Model training 
iven the uneven number of classes, the dataset described in 
ection 3.1 was balanced to consist of 41,236 samples of both 
acket types. Subsequently, a random subset of approximately 
0% of the dataset was selected for training, with 24,741 sam- 
les of each class. The remaining 40% of the dataset was used 
or testing, with 16,495 samples of each class. 
Previous work by Anthi et al. (2018) reported that 
eka’s implementation of Ross Quinlan’s C4.5 algorithm 
 Quinlan, 2014 ), the J48 Decision Tree method with no pruning,
as the best performing classifier in discriminating between 
ifferent cyber attacks. In this paper, to explore how well su- 
ervised machine learning algorithms can detect DoS attacks 
c o m p u t e r s  &  s e c u r i t y  1 0 8  ( 2 0 2 1 )  1 0 2 3 5 2  7 
Table 2 – Weighted average results following 10-fold 
cross-validation. 
Classifier P R F 
J48 Decision Tree 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Random Forest 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Naive Bayes 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Bayesian Network 0.999 0.999 0.999 
SVM 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Zero R 0.500 0.500 0.405 
























































































in an IoT environment, the corresponding smart home dataset
was used to evaluate a range of state-of-the-art classifiers dis-
tributed as part of Weka. 
Classifiers included generative models that consider con-
ditional dependencies in the dataset or assume conditional
independence (e.g. Bayesian Network, Naive Bayes) and dis-
criminative models that aim to maximise information gain or
directly map data to their respective classes without model-
ing any underlying probability or structure of the data (e.g. J48
Decision Tree, SVM). 
Table 2 demonstrates the results following classification,
reporting models with the highest performances, with each
using their default parameters. The overall performance rep-
resents weighted-averaged of precision (P), recall (R), and F1-
score (F) for all experiments. 
Overall, the classification performance for detecting DoS-
specific attacks across each classifier achieved a high result.
This is intuitive to DoS attacks as such packets have distinct
values (i.e. len and ip.ttl values) in comparison to those that are
benign. In particular, the classification performances of the J48
Decision Tree with no pruning, Random Forest, Bayesian Net-
work, and SVM achieved the best performances, resulting in
F1-scores of 99.9%. 
5.3. Generating perturbed samples 
Based on the observations in Section 5.1 and to support the
initial AML experiments within this paper, a range of feature
combinations were perturbed. Firstly, to investigate how per-
turbing individual features may affect the classifier, adversar-
ial samples were generated where only one of the features was
modified at a time. 
This approach aims to mask adversarial samples to be-
nign packets as closely as possible. Given the distributions
in Section 5.1 , the len and ip.ttl feature values of the mali-
cious packets were perturbed as being a random value be-
tween the ranges of 54 and 194 and 30 and 70 respectively.
For the flag features, the adversarial samples were gener-
ated by randomly setting the flag (1) and unsetting the flag
(0). To explore whether a lower rate of packet flow can af-
fect the classifier’s performance, the tcp.time_delta feature was
altered by increasing their values incrementally by five per-
cent up to 50%. Finally, to explore whether DoS packets with
lower tcp.time_delta values are misclassified as benign, adver-
sarial samples were generated when all features, excluding
tcp.time_delta , were perturbed. To avoid bias, and by drawing inspiration from the cross-
validation method ( Refaeilzadeh et al., 2009 ), 20 iterations
of perturbed samples for each feature-set were generated.
Table 3 shows an example of how a malicious DoS packet may
be modified when all features, excluding tcp.time_delta , are per-
turbed during the first 5 iterations given this approach. 
It is worth highlighting, although such method of pertur-
bation may be considered forceful, this level of perturbation
is possible to be achieved by an adversary, specifically in IoT
network environments. This is because the behaviour of the
devices are not considered as being variable and do not have
extreme deviations. As a result, an adversary can employ pas-
sive sniffing techniques to observe the activity of the IoT net-
work, and thus craft and deploy adversarial attacks. 
6. Evaluating the model on adversarial 
samples 
The J48 Decision Tree, Random Forest, Bayesian Network, and
SVM classifiers were first evaluated on the training dataset us-
ing 10-fold cross-validation and applied to the original testing
dataset. The F1-score achieved by each classifier was 99.9%.
The confusion matrix in Table 5 shows how the predicted
classes in the original testing dataset compare against the ac-
tual ones following 10-fold cross-validation using the J48 De-
cision Tree. 
To explore the effects of the AML attack on the pre-trained
classifier, adversarial samples were generated for all malicious
DoS data points present in the testing data by individually per-
turbing each of the features discussed in Section 5.1 , as well
as perturbing all features, excluding tcp.time_delta . The ratio-
nale behind this is to investigate the model’s behaviour when
the adversary only alters packet features and not the rate of
the attack. The original malicious packets were excluded from
the testing data. The adversarial samples were subsequently
included along with the benign testing data points and pre-
sented to the trained model. Table 4 therefore reports the av-
erage weighted Precision, Recall, and F1-score following these
20 iterations for each classifier. 
When the tcp.flags.cwr, tcp.flags.ecn, tcp.flags.urg, len and
tcp.time_delta were perturbed individually, each of the mod-
els’ performances were unaffected. This may be explained by
the fact that such features have a lower importance score (see
Table 1 ) and also may rely on the values of other features to
distinctly discriminate between both packet types. 
When all features, excluding tcp.time_delta , were perturbed,
the classification performance of all the models were affected.
In particular, the J48 model achieved an F1-score of 52.7%, the
highest decrease across the models (a difference of 47.2 per-
centage points in comparison to its performance when classi-
fying the original testing data). This may be because the mali-
cious DoS packets were significantly modified, therefore their
similarity to the benign packets was increased. In addition,
when perturbing the ip.flags.df and ip.ttl features individually,
the J48 model’s performance achieved an F1-score of 73.3%
and 68.2% respectively; again, the highest decrease across the
models (a difference in 26.6 and 31.7 percentage points). This
may be explained by the fact that the majority of the benign
packets and a small number of DoS packets had the i ip.flags.df
8 c o m p u t e r s  &  s e c u r i t y  1 0 8  ( 2 0 2 1 )  1 0 2 3 5 2  
Table 3 – An example of how malicious packet features are perturbed. 
Packet len ip.ttl ip.flag.mf ip.flag.df tcp.flags.cwr 
Original Packet 94 64 0 0 1 
Iteration 1 147 37 1 0 1 
Iteration 2 64 36 0 0 1 
Iteration 3 129 66 0 0 1 
Iteration 4 185 30 0 0 1 
Iteration 5 171 48 0 0 0 
Table 4 – Classification performances when applied to generated adversarial samples. 
J48 Decision Tree Random Forest Bayesian Network SVM 
Perturbed Features P R F P R F P R F P R F 
All features (excluding tcp.time_delta ) 77.8 60.2 52.7 85.7 80.5 79.8 91.3 89.5 89.3 81.5 70.5 67.7 
ip.flags.df 83.3 75.0 73.3 92.8 91.6 91.5 99.5 99.5 99.5 83.3 75.0 73.4 
ip.flags.mf 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 91.3 89.4 89.3 
tcp.flags.cwr 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
tcp.flags.ecn 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
tcp.flags.urg 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
ip.ttl 81.6 70.9 68.2 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
len 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.7 99.7 99.7 96.8 96.6 96.6 99.9 99.9 99.9 
tcp.time_delta 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
Table 5 – Confusion matrix for the original testing dataset 




Actual DoS a 16,495 0 




















Table 6 – Confusion matrix after perturbing all select fea- 
tures (excluding tcp.time_delta ) following 10-fold cross- 
validation using the J48 Decision Tree. 
Predicted 
a b 
Actual DoS a 3,345 13,150 
Benign b 1 16,494 
Table 7 – Confusion matrix after perturbing ip.ttl following 
10-fold cross-validation using the J48 Decision Tree. 
Predicted 
a b 
Actual DoS a 6,901 9,594 
Benign b 1 16,494 
Table 8 – Confusion matrix after perturbing ip.flags.df fol- 




Actual DoS a 8,245 8,250 
Benign b 1 16,494 et. Due to the tools used to deploy the DoS attacks, the default 
TL value for these packets were set as 64. As a result, perturb- 
ng the TTL value between the aforementioned ranges signif- 
cantly altered the distribution of the feature values. Subse- 
uently, this demonstrated to impact the classifier’s perfor- 
ance. Given these results, to achieve the most impact, an ad- 
ersary would have to perturb all selected features excluding 
odifying the rate of the attack (i.e. tcp.time_delta ) to success- 
ully reduce the performance of a machine learning based IDS 
hat uses either of the four classifiers to support the classifi- 
ation of DoS packets, and subsequently divert malicious data 
oints. 
The confusion matrices in Tables 6 , 7 , and 8 provide a better 
nsight into the performance of the J48 Decision Tree across 
he experiments. In comparison to the original performance 
n Table 5 , the model demonstrates a significant increase in 
alse positives when all features, excluding tcp.time_delta , and 
hen only ip.ttl are perturbed. In addition to these results,
hen the ip.flags.df feature is perturbed, the model reports a 
igher false positive rate of almost 50%. 
c o m p u t e r s  &  s e c u r i t y  1 0 8  ( 2 0 2 1 )  1 0 2 3 5 2  9 
Table 9 – Perturbed data iteration with highest impact on 
the model’s performance. 
Classifier Iteration F1-score 
J48 Decision Tree 1 52.6 
Random Forest 7 79.5 
Bayesian Network 19 89.0 


































































7. Defending against adversarial machine 
learning 
There exist a few methods that attempt to defend against
AML attacks. Two of the most common approaches in-
clude adversarial training and adversarial sample detection.
Goodfellow et al. (2014b) demonstrated that re-training a
model on a dataset containing both the original and adversar-
ial data samples significantly improves its efficiency against
adversarial samples. The second method involves develop-
ing mechanisms of detecting adversarial samples using direct
classification, neural network uncertainty, or input processing
( Zizzo et al., 2019 ). However, such detection mechanisms have
not demonstrated as being robust enough in defending again
AML ( Athalye et al., 2018; Zizzo et al., 2019 ). 
Subsequently, given the positive findings of how AML af-
fects supervised detectors, the classifiers were further evalu-
ated using adversarial training. In this case, a random sam-
ple of 10% of the adversarial data points (1,650 packets)
when all features, excluding tcp.time_delta , were perturbed and
achieved the highest decrease in the model’s performance
were included in the original training dataset. Table 9 reports
the iteration of data, as well as the F1-score, achieved when
each model were applied to the perturbed data. 
The experiments described in Section 6 were repeated
by retraining the models on the newly generated training
datasets and applying them on the unseen adversarial sam-
ples generated in the remaining iterations. Table 10 reports the
average precision, recall, and F1-score following 20 iterations
which included newly selected random perturbed samples in
the training set following 10-fold cross-validation. 
The results demonstrate that including adversarial sam-
ples in the training data increased the performances of eachTable 10 – Classification performances following adversarial tra
J48 Decision Tree Rando
Perturbed Features P R F P 
All features (excluding tcp.time_delta ) 99.5 99.5 99.5 99.9 
ip.flags.df 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.9 
ip.flags.mf 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
tcp.flags.cwr 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
tcp.flags.ecn 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
tcp.flags.urg 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
ip.ttl 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9 
len 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.9 
tcp.time_delta 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 model. For each combination of features, the classification
performance achieved an F1-score of over 90%, an increase
of over 25 percentage points in comparison to the classifica-
tion performances reported in Table 4 . These results are intu-
itive, as, during adversarial training, the classifiers are trained
to recognise the extended decision boundaries of the features
which discriminate between benign and malicious packets. 
8. Conclusion 
Machine learning based IDSs are known as being fundamen-
tal methods for detecting cyber attacks in IoT systems due
to their reliability and versatility. However, as shown by the
results presented herein, it is evident that machine learning
based detectors are vulnerable to attacks that may severely
undermine or mislead their capabilities. Adversarial Machine
Learning (AML) may have significant repercussions for IoT
infrastructures, as adversaries may alter malicious DoS data
points to bypass the IDS, causing delayed detection of threats,
leakage of confidential information, and severe harm. There-
fore, in order to develop more robust machine learning based
IDSs, it is apparent that understanding the applicability of
AML attacks in IoT systems is crucial. 
This paper explored how adversarial attacks can be used
to target supervised classifiers by presenting generated ad-
versarial DoS samples to a trained model and understanding
their classification behaviours. To support the experiments in
this paper, an IoT network dataset containing benign and DoS
packets were used to train and test a selection of state-of-the-
art supervised classifiers, including the J48 Decision Tree, the
best performing classifier for detecting malicious and benign
packets in the IDS presented by Anthi et al. Anthi et al. (2018) .
The experiments herein focused on DoS attack packets as it
is one of the most severe attacks against IoT devices, it is fea-
sible to deploy by crafting custom packets, and finally, due to
the nature of DoS, an adversary can manipulate packet fea-
tures without voiding the attack. 
To identify which features can be manipulated, the impor-
tance of the features for discriminating against both packet
types was measured. Based on these results, the top-ranked
features were selected for perturbation to generate adversarial
packets. Firstly, to investigate how individual features may af-
fect the classifier, adversarial samples were generated where
only one of the features were modified at a time. An adver-ining. 
m Forest Bayesian Network SVM 
R F P R F P R F 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.1 99.1 99.1 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 94.6 94.0 94.0 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 













































































arial dataset was generated where all features, excluding 
cp.time_delta , were perturbed. Such samples were evaluated 
gainst four trained models, including J48 Decision Tree, Ran- 
om Forest, Bayesian Network, and SVM. The results demon- 
trate that perturbing all features, excluding tcp.time_delta ,
chieved the highest impact on the J48 model as the classifi- 
ation performance decreased by 47.2 percentage points (from 
9.9% to 52.7%). 
Given these positive findings, the paper also explores how 
dversarial samples can enhance the robustness of the mod- 
ls using adversarial training. A random sample of 10% of the 
enerated adversarial data points when all the features were 
erturbed was included in the original training dataset. The 
odels were retrained and applied to all unseen adversarial 
amples, excluding the adversarial samples included in the 
raining set. Overall, the classification performances signifi- 
antly increased when adversarial samples were present in 
he training datasets. 
The results reported herein demonstrate that the proposed 
pproach towards generating adversarial DoS packet sam- 
les is effective in reducing the performance of all the top- 
erforming classifiers. Subsequently, this indicates that this 
ethod is successful in attacking a range of supervised clas- 
ifiers of different types, mainly generative and discriminative 
odels. There is scope to expand this approach as part of fu- 
ure work to target other attack types, as well as other types 
f machine learning, such as unsupervised and deep learning 
ethods. 
. Limitations and Future Work 
he experiments outlined herein have shown that adversar- 
al DoS samples can successfully be produced in the context 
f IoT network traffic and can significantly affect the classifi- 
ation efficiency of a supervised machine learning based IDS.
owever, it is important to highlight that the approach pre- 
ented herein has its limitations. 
One of the main limitations surrounding this work is the 
rude approach towards the perturbation of the chosen fea- 
ures. That is, here, we assume that the adversary has full 
nowledge of the dataset and the trained model. Therefore,
ollowing the analysis of the benign packets, the adversary 
an identify the ranges in which the feature values fall into 
nd subsequently map the malicious packets to mimic the 
ehaviours of the benign. The manual overhead associated 
ith this approach may be addressed by utilising a more so- 
histicated method of generating perturbed packets (e.g. It- 
rative Gradient Sign, Carlini Wagner, Generative Adversarial 
etworks (GANs)), where the attacker does not know the sys- 
em or the dataset. 
The work presented in this paper focuses on perturbing 
alicious DoS packets to bypass the detector. However, this 
s only the tip of the iceberg. The applicability of such an 
pproach and other AML approaches of bypassing machine 
earning-based IDSs need to be further investigated for other 
ttack types. 
Lastly, with regards to adversarial training, the results 
emonstrated the efficiency of such an approach to increase 
he robustness of the IDS. However, it is important to highlight hat this method may not always be sufficient as it is difficult 
o anticipate all possible types of AML attacks against a given 
ystem. Therefore, there is a need to investigate other, more 
ophisticated defence mechanisms. 
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